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Since the late 1980s, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in international 
development in Japan have become increasingly interested in incorporating advocacy 
into their operations. Despite the enthusiasm, however, NGO advocacy in Japan has 
been rather stagnant, not yet experiencing a dramatic boost. Given such situation, this 
paper analyzes the challenges development NGOs in Japan face in undertaking 
advocacy work. In doing so, the paper dissects NGO advocacy into aim, approach, and 
audience. 
 During the 1980s and 1990s, development NGOs in Japan faced an 
unfavorable legal structure that led these organizations to suffer from chronic financial 
instability. Forced to emphasize fundraising for service delivery, many of the 
development NGOs in Japan did not have the capacity to undertake other types of 
public communication programs, i.e. advocacy. The restricted environment allowed 
only a limited number of NGOs to engage in advocacy during this period, which were 
mostly policy recommendation to the Japanese government through lobbying.  
 The unfavorable legal structure began to show dramatic change in the 2000s. 
The new NPO Law enacted in 1998 and the new tax system for nonprofits instituted in 
2001 eased the financial issue of development NGOs, thus allowing them to incorporate 
more advocacy work. Increased involvement to advocacy led to successful 
implementation of Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign of 2005, a major turning 
point of NGO advocacy in Japan. In addition to lobbying the decision-makers, the 
campaign intentionally attempted to mobilize the general public. This expansion of 
approach and audience led to a new challenge in NGO advocacy in Japan; the Japanese 
public with a tendency to regard NGOs as fundraisers for service delivery rather than 
advocates now stands as the new obstacle.  
 The paper thus finds a shift of NGO advocacy challenge in Japan from 1980s 
and 1990s to 2000s. In-between these two periods, constraining factor shifted from 
incapacity for advocacy resulting from unfavorable legal structure to unreceptive 
audience. The new stage for NGO advocacy in Japan thus calls for careful attention to 
the qualitative aspect of advocacy work, i.e. messages articulated and delivered to the 
audience. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION: DEVELOPMENT NGOS AND ADVOCACY 
 
1.1  CALL FOR ADVOCACY 
 
Since the late 1980s, advocacy, in addition to service delivery, has come to be an important 
aspect of the work of development NGOs, or non-governmental organizations engaged in 
international development. The call for advocacy was especially strong for those NGOs based in 
the Northern industrialized countries, often called the Northern NGOs or NNGOs (Lewis, 2001; 
Lindenberg and Bryant, 2001; Edwards, 1999; Clark, 1991; Korten, 1990). 
 Underlying this trend were two growing recognitions widely spread across the 
development industry. On the one hand, development agencies came to realize the limited effect 
of service delivery through project works in developing countries; simply providing band-aids to 
the symptoms of poverty came to be recognized as insufficient for the ultimate aim of poverty 
alleviation. In response emerged a call to tackle the roots of poverty by attempting to transform 
fundamental structures, such as unfair trade mechanisms and multilateral/bilateral lending that 
led to stock-piling of debts in developing countries. At the same time, there was also a significant 
rise of development agencies in the Southern recipient countries. Local NGOs gradually 
increased in size and capacity to the extent that they began to displace Northern NGOs “as 
implementers, or even as channels for aid from government or multilateral agencies (Coates and 
David, 2002, p.503).”  
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 In such context, Northern NGOs “began to experience more and more confusion about 
their roles and identity, and by the mid-1990s this had produced a constant stream of rethinking 
and reorganizing for the future (Edwards, 1999, p.198).” One consequence was to seek a new 
role in advocacy, which accorded with the “call from the Southern organizations to do more 
campaign and policy work (Chapman and Fisher, 2000, p.151).”  
Development NGOs in Japan1 have been no exception to this trend. While the majority of 
development NGOs began their work as service delivery organizations during the 1970s and 
1980s, several NGOs have shown increasing interest in incorporating advocacy into their 
operations. A series of bi-annual surveys of Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation 
(JANIC)2 for example, shows steady increase in the number of development NGOs engaged in 
adobokashi, a Japanese word used to express advocacy. By 2006, at least one out of four 
development NGOs in Japan claimed to be involved in advocacy (please refer to Appendix for 
the list of NGOs engaged in advocacy as of February, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1Two terms are used to refer to development NGOs in Japan: kaihatsu (meaning development) NGOs and 
kokusai-kyoryoku (meaning international cooperation) NGOs.   
2JANIC is an umbrella organization of all development NGOs in Japan (somewhat similar to Interaction 
in the United States). This survey is the only source of quantitative data for development NGOs in Japan.  
 
Figure 1.1   Development NGOs Involved in Advocacy in Japan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004).   
Data for 2006 are obtained from JANIC online database, accessed February 3, 2008. 
 
 
In addition to increasing involvement in advocacy among individual NGOs, several collaborative 
advocacy campaigns have taken place in Japan since the late 1990s. Japan Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (JCBL) established in 1997, Jubilee 2000 Japan for debt cancellation, and Hottokenai 
Sekai no Mazushisa (“Don’t let it be, world poverty”) Campaign in 2005 are some of the major 
examples. Also in January 2007, more than 100 organizations came together to establish “2008 
Japan G8 Summit NGO Forum” to “appeal message of the civil society in international policy 
processes on the global issues through the G8 Summit to be held in Toyako, Hokkaido in 2008. 
3” Furthermore, some of the recently established organizations explicitly claim to be advocacy 
NGOs, i.e. Japan Results established in 1989 and Oxfam Japan in 2003. 
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 Contrary to increasing interests, however, promoting advocacy work has been no easy 
task for development NGOs in Japan (Kuroda and Imata, 2003). For example, while many 
organizations claim to be involved in advocacy, it has always been a limited number of the same 
NGOs taking initiative (Shigeta, 2005, p.223-234). This view is also reflected in the fact that 
only eight out of 67 NGOs who claimed to be engaged in advocacy in JANIC’s online database 
explicitly use the word adobokashi in their websites or organizational pamphlets, while 22 
organizations did not refer to advocacy or any related activities (see Appendix).  
 The aim of this paper is to analyze the obstacles development NGOs in Japan face in 
undertaking advocacy work.  In doing so, I apply the framework of distinguishing NGOs’ 
advocacy work into aim, approach, and audience. I also distinguish NGO advocacy in Japan into 
two periods, from 1980s to 1990s and from 2000s onwards. While the primary aim remained the 
same, approaches and audiences of NGO advocacy significantly expanded in between these two 
periods, thus transforming the nature of challenge NGOs face in promoting advocacy.  
 
1.2  THE CHALLENGE OF NGO ADVOCACY 
 
In the recent decades, there has been increasing literatures on so-called translational advocacy 
networks (e.g. Keck and Sikkink, 1999) or on transnational civil society (e.g. Florini, 1999). 
They are “self-organized advocacy groups that undertake voluntary collective action across state 
borders in pursuit of what they deem the wider public interest (Price, 2003, p.580).” Della Porta 
and Tarrow (2005) call the work of these organizations “transnational collective action,” 
specifically referring to “coordinated international campaigns on the part of networks of activists 
against international actors, other states, or international institutions (p.7).” Through rich 
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collection of case studies, researchers have shown the potential influence these transnational 
actors have in creating norms and setting policy directions both at state and international 
organization level. This paper builds on these studies by focusing on development NGOs’ 
advocacy efforts in Japan. Although Japan is one of the major donor countries around the world, 
there has been limited understanding of the work of development NGOs in Japan, especially in 
terms of its advocacy efforts. This paper intends to be one of the preliminary steps to fill in this 
gap.   
 The work of transnational advocacy networks, as easily imagined, faces various 
challenges, barriers, or obstacles. Four potential sources of barriers can be identified from 
literature to date. The first challenge discussed mainly in civil society studies is the effect of 
states’ legal and regulatory systems. States, through direct and indirect tools, influence 
nonprofits’ incentives for establishment as well as their organizational configurations (Salamon, 
2002). These tools include social regulation (e.g. granting of groups’ legal status) and economic 
regulation (e.g. tax benefits, grants, and contracts). Studies have revealed that state policies and 
tools as well as their influence on nonprofits vary across countries around the world (Salamon, 
1997). Japan has been one of the countries being examined through this political-institutional 
approach (Imada, 2006; Pekkanen, 2003; 2000; Amenomori, 1993).  
 Among various state pressures, direct influence of grants from authorities merits further 
attention for development NGOs. In general, it is argued that the more NGOs receive funding 
from the government or from international organizations, the less autonomy or independence 
they enjoy, thus less incentive to engage in advocacy that may result in criticizing their funding 
sources (Minear, 1987; Edwards, 1993).  
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 Barriers to advocacy may also be found within NGOs themselves. Many studies on 
development NGOs indicate the tendency of these NGOs to focus on service delivery in 
developing countries (Minear, 1987; Clark, 2003), thus lacking adequate human resources and 
budget on advocacy (Kuroda and Imata, 2004, 2003). Norrell (1999) also states that 
organizational structure that grants advocacy a more prominent role is also lacking among 
development NGOs. Hudson (2002) elaborates this point in that “misunderstandings, 
marginalisations, and questions about the values of advocacy in some cases translated into 
uncertainty, lack of clarity, and tensions about the appropriate position of advocacy within NGOs 
(p.408).” Attempting to enhance advocacy work in such an environment is difficult, resulting in 
absence of clear strategy and failure to develop alternatives to current orthodoxies (Edwards, 
1993).  
 Finally, barriers to advocacy may be found on the part of audience society. While few 
studies make this point, Kim (2007) argued in the context of Japan that because the Japanese 
society tends to regard advocacy as part of political activities, engagement of non-governmental 
organizations in this field is often considered undesirable. 
 In this paper, I build on these literatures while specifically expanding on the first and 
fourth barriers in discussing development NGOs’ advocacy challenge in Japan. In the first half of 
this paper, I take the political-institutional approach in examining the advocacy challenge of 
1980s and 1990s. I extend the institutional influence on NGOs’ organizational configuration to 
program level. In the second half of the paper, I take the cultural approach to examine the 
audience barrier, the advocacy challenge of the 2000s.  
 As Della Porta and Tarrow (2005) indicated, recent transnational collective actions 
“organize around particular campaigns or series of campaigns, using a variety of forms of 
7 
 
protests, adopting and adapting repertoires of protest from the traditions of different movements 
(p.12).”  I argue in this paper that transformation of movement strategy has certainly taken place 
in NGO advocacy in Japan, especially since the 2000s. The paper thus attempts to show how 
such transformation is leading to a shift of barriers in NGO advocacy in Japan.  
 
1.3 FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS:  
AIM, APPROACH, AND AUDIENCE OF ADVOCACY 
 
Advocacy is a term defined differently in various studies. Accordingly, the scope of advocacy 
varies among studies, researchers, and also NGOs. Rather than applying a particular definition to 
understand the Japanese case, this paper looks into how advocacy is understood by NGOs in 
Japan. In doing so, I distinguish advocacy into three interrelated components: aim, approach, and 
audience.   
With regard to aim, advocacy may attempt to influence either policies of 
authority/institution or practices that involve unequal power relationships (Jordan and Van Tuijl, 
2000, p.2052). The definition of advocacy Hudson (2002) states is a clear example of the former 
aim: “Advocacy is seen as involving efforts to change institutions’ policies in ways that are 
expected to favor the poor and marginalized (p.404).” Jordan and Van Tuijl (2000), on the other 
hand, defines advocacy to include broader function, i.e. practice - “NGO advocacy is an act of 
organizing the strategic use of information to democratize unequal power relations (p.2052).” To 
achieve the advocacy aim, specific approaches are taken by development NGOs. The two main 
advocacy approaches are lobbying and campaigning to mobilize the general public; research and 
policy analysis, development education, and networking complement these approaches (Norrell, 
1999, p.10-11). Approaches determine the audience of NGO advocacy. Lobbying is often 
targeted toward decision-makers of governments and international organizations, while 
campaigning tends to have general public as their primary audience.   
 
   
(aim) 
(approach and audience) 
Changing 
Practice 
Changing 
Policies 
Figure 1.2   Framework for Analyzing NGO Advocacy 
Lobbying to         
Decision-Makers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Campaigning for 
Public Mobilization 
 
 
This paper attempts to analyze NGO advocacy in Japan from these three interrelating 
perspectives (Figure 1.2) in showing a shift of advocacy challenge among development NGOs in 
Japan. 
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1.4. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
 
The paper consists of two chapters, distinguished into two time-periods. The first chapter focuses 
on 1980s and 1990s, when the unfavorable legal structure for nonprofits confined development 
NGOs’ public communication programs to fundraising for service delivery, resulting in 
incapacity to undertake advocacy work. Advocacy was sidelined, leading to lack of budget and 
human resources among development NGOs. Despite the restricted environment, a few NGO did 
manage to engage in advocacy work during the 1980s and 1990s. The chapter will discuss three 
cases of advocacy efforts by development NGOs during these time periods, which show the 
trend of policy recommendation to the Japanese government through lobbying. Tactics taken by 
development NGOs in undertaking advocacy work will also be discussed.   
 The second chapter turns attention to NGOs’ advocacy efforts of 2000s. With the new 
NPO Law enacted in 1989, the issue of financial instability among development NGOs was 
eased to a certain extent among many development NGOs. Also with the new tax system 
introduced in 2001, development NGOs were allowed for the first time in their history to obtain 
tax-deductable status for incoming donations. With more room for advocacy, development 
NGOs began to expand its advocacy approach from mere lobbying to campaigning to mobilize 
the general public. The audience accordingly expanded from governments to including the 
Japanese public. Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign, a Japanese platform of Global Call 
to Action against Poverty in 2005, was a symbolic turning point in this regard. I take this 
campaign as a case study to show the new obstacle NGOs face in promoting advocacy in Japan - 
the Japanese public, unfamiliar with development NGOs’ advocacy work, have trouble 
understanding what advocacy aims for, thus narrowing interpreting its aim as fundraising for 
10 
 
service delivery.  The paper explores this point through criticisms of the Hottokenai Sekai no 
Mazushisa Campaign.  
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2.0 STRUGGLEING IN AN UNFAVORABLE ENVIRONMENT:  
ADVOCACY EFFORTS FROM 1980s TO 1990s 
 
Development NGOs in Japan began to emerge during the late 1970s, mostly as service delivery 
organizations focusing on providing education and healthcare in the developing world.  
Commitment to advocacy work was not seen until the late 1980s and early 1990s when a small 
number of NGOs began lobbying the Japanese government for changes in Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) policies.  
This chapter explores the obstacles that prevented development NGOs in Japan from 
engaging in advocacy work during the 1980s and 1990s. In so doing, I mainly take the political-
institutional perspective, a view that emphasizes the influence of state action and political 
institutions on organizational dimensions of civil society. Studies on civil society have applied 
this theory to understand the lagged development of civil society in Japan (Amenomori, 2007; 
Pekkanen, 2003). I build on these studies to show the influence of Japanese legal structure for 
nonprofits on development NGOs’ priority-setting at program level. Until the late 1990s, legal 
structure surrounding nonprofit organizations in Japan was disadvantageous to development 
NGOs, especially in terms of financing. I argue that public communication programs of 
development NGOs had no choice but to concentrate on fundraising for service delivery, 
resulting in incapacity to do other types of programs, i.e. advocacy. 
A few development NGOs, nonetheless, did manage to undertake some advocacy work  
12 
 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Their attempts were mostly making policy recommendations to the 
Japanese government and other related agencies through lobbying. The second half of this 
chapter will analyze examples of such advocacy efforts. The cases will show strategies taken by 
development NGOs to overcome the disadvantageous environment.  
 
2.1 UNFAVORABLE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 
LEGAL STRUCTURE FOR NONPROFITS 
 
From historical perspective, the nonprofit sector in Japan can be characterized as having a dual 
structure of “the government-controlled nonprofit sector” and “the newly emerging nonprofit 
sector” (Matsubara and Todoroki, 2003). This unique structure derives from the reluctance of the 
Japanese government to adopt policies that officially authorize nonprofit organizations until the 
late 1990s. Development NGOs were one of the pioneering fields in the “the newly emerging 
nonprofit sector” that begun to emerge in the late 1970s to 1980s (Hayashi and Imada, 1999, 
p.111).  
 
2.1.1  Government-Controlled Nonprofit Sector 
 
Legal structure regarding the nonprofit sector in Japan is based on the Civil Code, enacted in 
1898. Article 34 states: 
Any association or foundation relating to any academic activities, art, charity, worship, 
religion, or other public interest which is not for profit may be established as a juridical  
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person with the permission of the competent government agency. 
Organizations established under this law are named public-interest legal persons (PIPs: koueki-
houjin), further distinguished into aggregate corporation (shadan-houjin) and foundation 
(zaidan-houjin). In relation to PIPs, Article 67 of the Civil Code states:  
1. The business of a juridical person shall be subject to the supervision by the   
competent government agency. 
2. The competent government agency may issue to the juridical person any order which 
shall be necessary for the purpose of its supervision. 
3. The competent government agency may, by exercising its authority, inspect the      
  status of the business and property of a juridical person at any time. 
The Civil Code, as implied by these articles, grants extensive authority to “competent 
government agency (ministry or other government agency mostly related to the work of relevant 
organization)” in dealing with an organization seeking for PIP status or already with the legal 
status.  
Influence of competent agency comes both at the time of initial approval for legal status, 
and after the approval has occurred. When a nonprofit organization first seeks for PIP status, the 
application proceeds to screening at the competent agency. The criteria used for this screening 
mechanism are not very clear except for few items, e.g. financial requirements to possess 300 
million yen (approximately $2.7 million4) in capital. Bureaucrats have the discretionary power to 
make approval decision. It is not hard to imagine, then, that organizations whose objectives or 
 
4Calculated at the rate $1=110 yen. This rate has been applied to all dollar statistics in this paper.  
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styles differ from the competent agency find it difficult to gain approval. Under this legal 
monopoly, declined organizations are not allowed to make any objection. 
Once a PIP status is approved, an organization will enjoy tax breaks as well as the 
legitimacy granted by the government. However, PIP organization continues to be under 
authority of the competent agency. As logistical issues, PIPs must submit reports on annual 
activities, list of assets, accounts of changes in membership, financial statements for the past year, 
and planned activity reports as well as budget estimates for the coming fiscal year. Not only so, 
competent agencies are granted with monitoring and sanctioning power; they may make on-site 
inspections and audits at any time, issue supervisory orders (Article 71), impose fines on 
directors for violating any order of the competent agency (Article 84), and may even cancel and 
dissolve a PIP (Article 68). 
 For PIP organizations, close coordination with competent agencies and compliance with 
bureaucrats’ preferences becomes more important than mass membership under this extensive 
oversight of competent agency. There were many obedient PIPs that came to host a large number 
of retired bureaucrats and receive operating income; some PIPs were even established with 
funding from government ministries (Pekkanen, 2003, p.121).  
If an organization wishes to obtain legal status other than the PIPs, its establishment had 
to be based on other special laws as stated in Article 33 of Civil Code. Examples of such are: 
Private School Law (1947) for educational corporation, Medical Law (1949) for medical 
corporation, Religious Corporation Law (1951), and Social Welfare Service Law (1951) for 
social welfare corporations. A majority of the public-interest legal persons established based on 
Article 34 have institutionalized as specified corporations under these special laws. The  
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supervisory conditions for these organizations are basically the same as PIPs.  
 It was therefore virtually impossible for an organization to be a legal corporation and at 
the same time be truly “non-government” and “private” in Japan (Imada, 2006, p.20). In other 
words, nonprofits in Japan were strictly supervised by government agencies, virtually being 
QuaNGOs. The Japanese Civil Code has been amended several times after its enactment in 1898, 
but never the articles related to nonprofit organizations5. This situation has often been referred to 
as the inadequacy of the Civil Code in Japan.  
The Japanese society did not question such government policies and legal structures on 
nonprofits as people had a high level of belief on government and relied on them as the major 
public service provider (Matsubara and Todoroki, 2003, p.30; Ouchi, 2004, p.39). Salamon 
(1996) pointed out, in the introduction for the  Japanese version of his book, that in Japan: 
strong bureaucracy, one of the main byproducts from the end of nineteenth century, and 
huge enterprises that emerged after the World War II, left no space for these private 
voluntary associations that are distinctive in the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Germany….While it is fundamentally a “right” in most of the developed countries to 
establish nonprofit organizations, in Japan it is considered as a “privilege” that is given 
and deprived by individual government agencies (pp.i-iii). 
 
 
 
 
 
5On May 26, 2006, three new laws regarding PIPs were passed in the national parliament. These laws are 
to mitigate oversight by individual government agencies for the first time in 110 years.  
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2.1.2  The Newly Emerging Nonprofit Sector  
 
The Japanese Civil Code, however, does not deny freedom of association. In the 1970s, civil 
society organizations in the field of welfare, education, environment and international 
development began to emerge apart from “the government-controlled nonprofit sector.” 
Development NGOs were one of the pioneering fields of this “newly emerging nonprofit sector.”  
These newly emerging organizations had to choose from two paths as they began its 
operation in Japan - either to obtain legal status under the Civil Code and accept government 
oversight or to remain as non-legal private voluntary organizations. Choosing the latter makes it 
difficult for an organization to act as an economic agency, e.g. restriction on obtaining public 
subsidies, tax breaks, tax incentives for incoming donations, and inability to open bank account 
under the organization name (thus a donation appears as if given to an individual, e.g. director). 
These restrictions were considered to be a potential constraint to organizational growth.  
Some development NGOs, established in the early days of the sector history in the 
1960s and 1970s, did choose to obtain legal status. For example, International Organization for 
Cultivating Universal Human Spirit (now renamed OISCA or Organization for Industrial, 
Spiritual and Cultural Advancement) established in 1961 is a foundation; Asia Rural Social 
Leadership Institute (now renamed Asian Rural Institute) established in 1973 is registered as an 
educational corporation (for more examples, see Appendix). 
 However, most of the organizations in the field of international development chose the 
latter path and remained as non-legal voluntary organizations until the early 2000s (Figure 2.1). 
These NGOs preferred to avoid bureaucratic interference, despite the constraints on its 
operations.  
 Figure 2.1   Development NGOs With/Without Legal Status  
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Source: Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (1996, 1998, 2000).  
 
2.1.3  Emphasis on Fundraising for Service Delivery  
 
The inadequate legal structure for nonprofit organizations brought about substantive impact on 
development NGOs’ public communication programs towards the Japanese society. Without 
legal status, financing was a critical issue at all times for majority of development NGOs 
(Kuroda and Imata, 2002, p.4). In order to sustain the organization and to advance its mission, 
development NGOs had no choice but to focus public communication on fundraising to maintain 
service deliveries in the Southern development countries.  
The situation was further exacerbated by the lack of a giving culture in Japan. Ouchi 
(2004), for example, pointed out “exchange etiquette” as an inhibitive factor of charitable giving 
in Japan. Ouchi says that in Japan:  
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human relationships are built and nurtured through repaying the obligations that one 
assumes to the other by respect, loyalty, and obedience. Japanese are willing to help 
people with whom they have a clear relationship such as families, relatives, and friends 
to meet reciprocal social responsibilities. Conversely, the etiquette of giving and 
receiving makes Japanese reluctant to contribute to unknown people beyond their 
sphere of obligations or in an indiscriminate manner (p. 47). 
On the other hand, Matsubara and Todoroki (2003, pp.4-6) say that although there is a 
culture of giving in Japan, the amount of giving per person is small compared to other countries. 
There are two explanatory factors for this small amount of giving. One of such factors is the 
ancient Chinese concept of intoku-youhou which teaches that while good deeds may bring 
benefits, they should be performed in a secret manner. Thus, people tend to value a small amount 
of giving in secret manner, rather than a big amount of money that stands out. Yokonarabi-ishiki 
or the distinctive inclination of Japanese people to “follow the group” is another underlying 
factor. Yokoharabi-ishiki is a common Japanese tendency to see one’s identity in terms of one’s 
group or colleagues, and to seek for similar standards as others. Therefore, people preferred to 
give what others are giving, and avoided giving amounts that stand out. Through this process, 
charitable giving has remained in small amounts, in regard to collectivism and group harmony.  
Thus, among the Japanese public who do not place importance on visibility and 
recognition, it was difficult for the culture of giving to nurture. Lack of giving culture meant 
further difficulty in fundraising for “the newly emerging nonprofit sectors” - in addition to 
inadequate legal structures, lack of giving culture forced development NGOs in Japan to place 
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further focus on fundraising in their public communications6. While forced to devote its public 
communication to fundraising for service delivery by the legal structure yet discouraged to do so 
by lack of giving culture, development NGOs found themselves in a double-bind situation. 
Under this condition, development NGOs were deprived of its capacity to undertake advocacy 
work. Lack of capacity for advocacy meant lack of budget and human resources for 
implementing advocacy. Until the late 1990s, most organizations did not have full-time advocacy 
staff (Matsumoto, 2004, p.152) nor any budget for advocacy.  
 
2.2  ADVOCACY EFFORTS 
 
Despite the disadvantageous situation, some development NGOs nonetheless did attempt to 
engage in advocacy work in the late 1980s and 1990s. The impetus came not only from NGOs 
themselves, but also from social background of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA). 
In 1989, Japan became the top donor in providing the largest amount of ODA around the world. 
In response, several studies, books, as well as media coverage on Japan’s contribution to 
international development was seen. Increasing attention to ODA, ironically, brought the Marcos 
scandal to the front page, invoking suspicions of ODA among the Japanese public. The scandal 
revealed strong ties the Japanese government and Japanese business enterprises have had in 
implementing ODA project in the Philippines, with funds recycling to the coffers of Japanese 
firms. The Macros scandal also revealed how the Japanese ODA had contributed to sustaining 
 
6Matsubara and Todoroki (2003) make an interesting point that some nonprofits have even given up 
fundraising (which means these organizations have given up further organizational development). 
According to Economic Planning Agency (1999), 79.6% of nonprofit organizations without corporate 
status no longer engaged in fundraising activities.  
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corruption of authoritarian regime in the Philippines. By the early 1990s, Japanese people came 
to question the management of increasing ODA; development NGOs were also stimulated to 
make policy recommendation for ODA reforms, a tradition which continues to date. 
To engage in advocacy, development NGOs had to overcome a disadvantageous legal 
structure to secure sufficient financial and human resources. In doing so, NGOs followed several 
strategies. First, NGOs formed networks or alliances rather than acting individually. Examples 
are Reconsider Aid Citizens’ League (REAL) established in 1986 as Japan’s first NGO dedicated 
to changing Japanese aid; Mekong Watch established by 12 Japanese NGOs engaged in 
environmental or development NGOs in Indochina; and Citizen-NGO Liaison Council for ODA 
Reform (renamed as ODA Reform Network in 2000) established by more than 50 Japanese 
NGOs in 1996.  
In addition to alliance building, NGOs in Japan took the strategy to work closely with 
international alliances, networks, and coalitions. Especially in the earlier days, NGOs also 
approached and collaborated with environmental organizations who were already actively 
engaged in policy recommendation in Japan. These strategies are evident in the following three 
advocacy efforts made by NGOs during the late 1980s and 1990s. Through these advocacy 
works, NGOs became “a conduit of global norms and a successful advocate for change in 
Japan’s ODA and foreign policy (Hirata, 2002, p.97).” 
 
2.2.1  Lobbying to Cancel an ODA Loan Project in India  
 
In 1987, the Japanese government began a project to loan 2.85 billion yen (around US $450  
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million) to the Indian government for building a large-scale hydroelectric plant in Narmada 
Valley in India. Because the loan was intended to supplement Sardar Sarovar Dam project 
promoted by the World Bank, it caught the attention of the global anti-Narmada campaign. 
International activists claimed that the dam would influence the lives of over 100 thousand 
people living in 230 villages, forcing them to resettle without any opportunity to have their 
voices heard.  
Stimulated by these international activists, NGOs in Japan began to lobby the Japanese 
government to cancel the project. With Friends of the Earth taking initiative, NGOs approached 
legislators, Diet members, and bureaucrats in the four ministries involved in the project: Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and 
Economic Planning Agency. 
NGOs’ lobbying efforts were amplified when the Narmada Dam issue became a subject 
of Congressional special hearing in Washington D.C. This incident gave NGOs in Japan more 
credibility to deal with this issue, and also gave rise to further interest among Japanese 
politicians.  
In April 1990, NGOs held the first International Narmada Dam Symposium (or the 
Tokyo Symposium), bringing together international activists as well as Japanese Diet members, 
journalists and academics. Legislators by this point were motivated to join the NGOs, and asked 
for a preliminary assessment of the loan project to the four cooperating ministries. What came 
out was in favor of NGOs’ claims – the director of the Economic Cooperation Bureau at Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs admitted that while the government had repeatedly claimed that they had sent 
several missions to India for preliminary studies, only one mission was sent in reality. Worse yet,  
22 
 
this mission had not even produced a single report. With this, the Japanese government decided 
to cancel the project, despite the previous three years of work and the half built plant. This was 
the first time in history that the government yielded to the pressure from NGOs in Japan. 
 
2.2.2   Lobbying to Cancel a Pesticide Project in Cambodia  
 
In 1992, the Japanese government initiated an ODA project to provide pesticides to Cambodia to 
promote agricultural productivity. The project budget was 500 million yen (approximately 
US$4.5 million), of which 350 million yen was allocated for three tons of agricultural chemicals. 
Because the three types of insecticides to be provided (diazinon, fervalerate, and fenitrothion) 
were considered harmful to local environment and people, NGOs in the fields of development 
and environment gathered together to terminate this project. Leading agencies were Japan 
International Volunteer Center (JVC) and Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC). Japan 
Tropical Forest Action Network (JATAN) and the Pacific-Asia Resource Center (PARC) also 
joined the network. NGOs claimed that some of these pesticides were strictly restricted in the 
United States, and that Cambodia had no legislation or other means for controlling safe use of 
these pesticides. While the project was established in response to the request of the Cambodian 
government, NGOs were also suspicious about the fact that prior to this request, two Japanese 
firm (Sumitomo Chemical Co. and Nippon Kayaku Co.) tied to the Japanese government had 
advised the Cambodian government on which pesticides to order.  
The issue was first criticized by CCC and international organizations located in 
Cambodia, i.e. International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) and Food and Agriculture  
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Organization (FAO). In December 1992, NGOs submitted a letter of protest along with policy 
recommendation to the Japanese Embassy in Phnom Penh and to the Cambodian Ministry of 
Agriculture. Another letter was sent in January 1993, although no response came from the 
Embassy. Also in December 1992, Japanese NGOs lobbied Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan 
to state the need for re-appraisal of pesticide aid.  
In February 1993, JVC held a symposium and submitted a statement to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, demanding the project to be terminated. In July 1993, JVC in Phnom Penh 
brought a professor, a member of an International NGO Pesticide Action Network North 
America, to do research on Cambodia’s agricultural conditions and to meet Cambodian officials 
in the Ministries of Agriculture, Environment and Health, as well as the Japanese Ambassador. 
In October 1993, CCC again submitted a petition to the Japanese Embassy and the Cambodia 
Ministry of Agriculture. JVC also initiated a memorandum among expatriate agronomists in 
Cambodia, and also set up meeting for them to discuss with the Japanese Embassy. Mass media 
began to seriously consider this issue at this point.  
 In 1993, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) finally acknowledged in an 
internal report that sending pesticides to Cambodia was a mistake, leading to the cancellation of 
the project.   
 
2.2.3  Anti-Landmine Movement  
 
In October, 1996, Canada sponsored an international strategy conference in Ottawa to discuss a 
legally binding international agreement to ban antipersonnel (AP) land mines. A follow-up 
conference was held in Brussels in June, 1997, that launched formal negotiations on a ban treaty, 
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announcing a declaration to affirm the commitment of the participating states to sign the treaty in 
December, 1997.  
 The Japanese government was reluctant to take part in this Ottawa process, despite its 
interest in landmine issues. Japan had provided ODA to assist landmines victims in Cambodia in 
1997, and had hosted a conference on demining technology in March, 1997. Reluctance of the 
Japanese government came from the constraints of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty; United States 
was against signing the treaty insisting Korean Peninsula to be exempted to ensure the security 
of U.S. troops in South Korea. The United States also claimed for certain types of AP mines be 
exempted from the treaty, and to delay the enforcement period as long as nine years. Japanese 
Defense Agency, afraid of taking different stance as the United States, argued that the 
circumstances surrounding Japan are different from other pro-Ottawa countries, and that Japan 
should not sign the treaty.  
  While Japan did observe the Brussels conference, it did not sign the Declaration right 
away. In response to this situation, the Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL) was 
established in July 1997 as a local branch of International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) 
“to pressure the Japanese government to fully support the Mine Ban Treaty and contribute to the 
elimination of landmines throughout the world (Hirata, 2002, p.116).” About 40 NGOs joined 
JCBL, including Association on Phnom Penh, Citizens’ Forum on Cambodia, and Japan 
International Volunteer Center (JVC).  
JCBL lobbied officials and politicians in the Japanese government to participate in the 
Ottawa process. In August of 1997, JCBL submitted a petition to Prime Minister Ryutaro 
Hashimoto, followed by another letter later that month. NGOs did succeed in bringing Japan to  
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participate in the Oslo Conference held also in August 1997, which adopted the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AP Mines. However, Japan 
did not sign the treaty following the withdrawal of the United States.  
Several incidents, nonetheless, came in favor of JCBL: the death of Diana Princess of 
Wales who previously worked to ban landmines; the new Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi in 
favor of anti-landmines; the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to ICBL and Jody Williams, the 
ICBL Coordinator. JCBL’s credibility was boosted, which encouraged further lobbying efforts 
by NGOs in Japan. 
In mid-November 1997, JCBL handed in person a petition to Foreign Minister Obuchi, 
urging him to sign the Mine Ban Treaty, which was scheduled to be established in Ottawa in 
December that year. Obuchi decided to fly himself to Ottawa to join the signing ceremony and 
announced that the Japanese government would contribute 10 billion yen (approximately 
US$90.9 million) for mine clearance and victim assistance from 1998 to 2003. 
 Getting the Japanese government to sign the Treaty, however, was not the final goal for 
JCBL. Their goal had then transformed into pressuring the Japanese government to ratify the 
treaty. The Defense Agency was the strongest opponent in this ratification process as U.S. troops 
stockpiled landmines on their bases in Japan. Nuclear test explosions by India and Pakistan in 
May 1998 further delayed ratification; the same section of Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in 
charge of both landmines and nuclear arms control issues. 
In response to these unfavorable conditions, JCBL lobbied politicians who were known 
to be in favor of the Mine Ban Treaty. After the Ottawa process, several politicians had formed a 
League of Diet Members to Promote a Comprehensive Ban on Antipersonnel Landmines. In 
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 1998, JCBL hosted a symposium on landmines with the Canadian Embassy where officials from 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense Agency, as well as politicians gathered together. Also in 
1998, the League arranged a meeting between JCBL and Obuchi, who had then become a Prime 
Minister, together with officials from Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 These lobbying efforts successfully led the Diet to finally pass a domestic law to ratify 
the Mine Ban Treaty. On September 30, 1998, the Diet passed the Law Concerning the 
Prohibition of the Production of Antipersonnel Landmines and the Regulation of their Possession.  
The Mine Ban accordingly became effective in Japan on March 1, 1999. This ratification led to 
increasing allocation of Japanese ODA for promoting demining activities and victims’ 
rehabilitation.   
 
2.3 ADVOCACY IN THE 1980s AND 1990s: 
LOBBYING FOR POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the unfavorable legal structure surrounding nonprofits led 
development NGOs to suffer from chronic financial instability and also the incapacity to take 
public communication programs other than fundraising for service delivery, i.e. advocacy. 
Despite the constraints on budget and human resources, however, few NGOs did manage to 
engage in policy recommendations for ODA reform through lobbying politicians, legislators, and 
bureaucrats. The three cases in this chapter showed this trend, as well as the tactics development 
NGOs took to overcome the disadvantageous conditions: 1) forming networks and alliances 
rather than acting individually, 2) connecting with international networks and alliances, and 3) 
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connecting with environmental NGOs with more experience in making policy recommendation 
to the government.  
Because NGOs’ advocacy during the 1980s and 1990s began mainly as policy 
recommendations for ODA reform through lobbying, the primary audience was decision-makers 
in the Japanese government. Accordingly, rarely did we see NGOs intentionally approaching the 
general public as part of their advocacy efforts – a trend we begin to see in the 2000s.  
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3.0  MOBILIZING THE PUBLIC: ADVOCACY EFFORTS OF 2000s 
 
The second chapter turns attention to NGOs’ advocacy efforts of 2000s, when the approach 
began to expand from solely lobbying to campaigning to mobilize the general public. While the 
primary aim remained as changing policies, the audience of NGO advocacy expanded from 
governments to the Japanese public.   
For development NGOs in Japan, the millennium began with new legal structure. The 
NPO Law enacted in 1998 allowed many development NGOs to obtain legal status without strict 
government oversight; institution of Approved Specified Nonprofit Corporation in 2001 also 
provided an opportunity to obtain tax-deductable status for incoming donations. The issue of 
financial instability was thus eased to a certain extent, allowing development NGOs to 
incorporate more advocacy work into their operations. This scaling-up of advocacy led to the 
success of Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign of 2005, a major turning point of NGO 
advocacy in Japan. I take this campaign as a case study to show the shift in challenges that 
NGOs face in undertaking advocacy work; cultural analysis show that because the Japanese 
public tends to regard NGOs as fundraisers for service delivery rather than advocates, most 
people misunderstood the aim of this advocacy campaign as fundraising. The paper explores 
criticisms of Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign to examine this point. 
 
 
 
3.1  THE NEW LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
As public interests toward international cooperation and development continued to expand with 
extensive media attention on famine in Africa, the global environmental crisis, and the slogan of 
“internationalization” in the Japanese society, the number of development NGOs continued to 
increase throughout the 1980s and 1990s. As Figure 3.1 shows, the number grew dramatically in 
the early 1990s.  
 Figure 3.1  Number of Development NGOs in  Japan 
Source: Yumoto (2003, p.271) 
Accumulated Newly Established 
Newly  
Accumulated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In response to this expansion, official authorization of “the newly emerging nonprofit 
sector” began to be discussed as an urgent need. The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995 
became an important turning point; the tragedy made it evident to the Japanese society that 
(Postwar-Japan International Cultural Exchange Society, 2005, p.115):     
1. It is impossible to fully rely on government administration, 
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2. There are philanthropic resources that would complement such limitation of 
government in the Japanese civil society, and 
3. In order to effectively use such resources, there must be professional civil society 
organizations. 
The earthquake thus boosted social recognition of “the newly emerging nonprofit sector” of 
which development NGOs were a part.  
 
3.1.1  The New NPO Law 
 
In 1998, the Japanese government enacted Specified Nonprofit Activities Promotion Law 7  
(known as the NPO Law) to promote free civic activities that contribute to the society and to 
allow those organization obtain legal corporate status relatively easily without constraints from 
government agencies. The stated aim of this law is: 
…to contribute to the public interest by promoting the sound development of specified 
nonprofit activities as voluntary activities, such as volunteer activities, performed by 
citizens to contribute to society through the incorporation of organizations that conduct 
these specified nonprofit of activities. (Chapter 1, I).  
Organizations that fall under the following 12 categories were to be considered eligible for 
obtaining the legal status of specified nonprofit corporation8.   
 
7In some cases, the law is translated as the Special Nonprofit Organizational Law (e.g. Pekkanen, 2000). 
8The authorized fields of nonprofit activities expanded from 12 to 17 with the amendement of NPO Law 
in December 2002 (effective May 1, 2003): promotion of science and technology, promotion of economic 
activities, development of vocational expertise or expansion of employment opportunities, protection of 
consumers, administration of organizations that engage in above activities or provision of liaison, advice, 
or assistance in connection with the above activities. 
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1. Promotion of health, medical treatment, or welfare  
2. Promotion of social education  
3. Promotion of community development  
4. Promotion of science, culture, the arts, or sports  
5. Conservation of the environment  
6. Disaster relief  
7. Promotion of community safety  
8. Protection of human rights or promotion of peace  
9. International cooperation  
10. Promotion of a society with equal gender participation  
11. Sound nurturing of youth  
12. Development of information technology  
 This new law was a massive deregulation of government oversight compared to then-
existing institution of public-interest legal persons (PIPs) discussed in Chapter 1, opening up a 
new opportunity for “the newly emerging nonprofit sector” to gain legal status (Yamaoka, 2000, 
p.15-16). The deregulation was evident in two levels. First, the application procedure was clearly 
relaxed. Should an organization decide to apply for legal status under this new law, they will 
need only to provide the following documents to the competent agency9 : 1) the articles of 
incorporation, 2) a list of officers, 3) a list of ten or more members, 4) a document to verify the 
purposes of the organizations and non-affiliation with criminal (gangsters) organizations, 5) a 
                                                            
9 Competent agency for any organization with an established office in one prefecture is prefectural 
government, while Economic Planning Agency (EPA) handles those with offices in more than one 
prefecture. 
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prospectus. 6) a list of founders, and 7) minutes of a meeting that decided incorporation, 8) a list 
of assets, 9) a document to state the fiscal year, 10) operating plans and budget estimates for the 
year of incorporation and the following year. There is no longer a requirement of minimum asset 
holding for incorporation. Time needed for approval is also shortened - while it took several 
years to get approval under the Civil Code, this new Law requires the competent agency to make 
decisions within four months. Competent agencies no longer have the arbitrary discretion in 
making approvals (Ninka); they will now give certifying approval (Ninsho) to applying 
organizations. Accordingly, competent agencies cannot express any excuse for refusing to give 
“certifying approval” as long as the applying organization meets all the requirements. 
The second level of deregulation was the curtailing of government/bureaucratic oversight. 
As long as an organization submits the following documents to the competent agencies who then 
ensure public access to all information, public authority have no reason to deprive nonprofit 
organizations of their legal status: activities report, inventory of assets, balance sheet, statement 
of revenues and expenditures, list of officers, a document stating the names of all of those 
officers on the list of officers that received remuneration, and a document stating names and 
addresses of ten or more members. 
Development NGOs fall under the ninth category of this new NPO Law, international 
cooperation. As Figure 3.2 shows, many development NGOs exploited this opportunity and 
obtained legal status of “specified nonprofit corporation.” Freed from the “legal straightjacket 
imposed on civil-society organizations (Pekkanen, 2000, p.113),” development NGOs can now 
sign contracts, open bank accounts, hire staff, own property, sign lease agreements for office 
space, undertake joint projects with domestic government bodies, all under the organizational 
name. With these operational ramifications, many of the organization were able to expand its 
capacity further to engage in advocacy in its public communication programs. Out of the 67 
organizations involved in advocacy today, 43 organizations (64%) gained the legal status of 
specified nonprofits (see Appendix)10. 
 
Figure 3.2   Types of Legal Corporate Status of Development NGOs   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (2000, 2002, 2004).  
 
3.1.2  Approved Specified Nonprofit Corporations  
 
The New NPO Law, while giving development NGOs opportunities to obtain legal status, did 
not take into account the issue of giving tax-deductable status for incoming donations. A tax 
system that allowed greater flow of funds for nonprofits through tax-deductible donations, a 
crucial issue for those in “the newly emerging nonprofit sector,” was not dealt with until October, 
2001 when the government finally established a system called “Approved Specified Nonprofit 
                                                            
10For complete list of all Specified Nonprofit Organizations, see  
http://www.npo-homepage.go.jp/ninshou/nponinshou.html 
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Corporations (nintei NPO houjin).” This was the first institution in the history of Japan that 
specifically provided support to financial basis of those in “the newly emerging nonprofit 
sector.” 
Under this system, donors may claim to write-off tax for contributions made to Approved 
Specified Nonprofit Corporations. In order for an organization to obtain this new status, an 
organization must meet several requirements to be approved by the head of National Tax Agency. 
 The conditions are not easy for an organization to meet; as of January 1, 2008, only 74 
organizations out of over 20,000 specified nonprofit corporations have gained the this tax 
exempting status. The requirements were relaxed in 2006 to allow more organizations to qualify 
for obtaining the new status, e.g. deregulation of public support test, a numeric indicator that 
shows if the organization is supported by the public or not. As of March 11, 2008, 76 Specified 
Nonprofit organizations have been granted the approved status under this new system, of which 
20 organizations are involved in international development (26.3%)11. Of these 20 organizations, 
8 organizations are engaged in advocacy (see Appendix).   
 
3.2  ADVOCACY EFFORTS: LOBBYING TO CAMPAIGNING 
 
NGO advocacy in Japan during the 1980s and 1990s focused on influencing the Japanese 
government mainly through lobbying. However, given more capacity for advocacy with the new 
legal environment, NGOs began to employ a different approaches in their advocacy efforts.  
While the primary aim remained to influence government policies, NGOs began to intentionally 
 
008). 
11For the list of Specified Nonprofits with tax-deductable status, 
see  http://www.nta.go.jp/tetsuzuki/denshi-sonota/npo/meibo/01.htm (Retrieved March 25, 2
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mobilize the Japanese public to increase credibility of their policy recommendations. One of the 
most symbolic advocacy efforts in this regard is Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign of 
2005. In the following section, I will take a closer look at this case to elaborate the shift of 
challenges in NGO advocacy.  
 
3.2.1  The Turning Point:  Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign  
 
Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign (meaning “don’t let it be, world poverty”) is a 
collaborative national advocacy campaign for worldwide Global Call to Action against Poverty12. 
Bringing together 68 NGOs, the Campaign was officially established in May 26, 2005 to raise 
public awareness toward international development and to appeal to the Japanese government to 
prioritize poverty alleviation in its agenda for G8 Summit, Millennium Plus Five Summit, and 
the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference. Initial funding came from Oxfam UK and NOVIB in 
Holland.  
Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign was “the first full-scale advocacy movement 
in Japan (Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign, 2008, p.15).”  The Campaign aimed at 
delivering a message to the politics and societies in Japan to “change the system that creates 
global poverty,” rather than providing direct support to developing countries. Advocacy was 
defined as “activities that aims to transform the ways and means of politics and others by 
gathering people’s voices as seen in policy recommendation and rights movement (ibid, p.4).” 
 
12The Global Call to Action against Poverty, or GCAP, is a global alliance of trade unions, community 
groups, faith groups and campaigners working together across more than 100 national platforms. GCAP 
calls for action from the world’s leaders to meet their promises to end poverty and inequality. Examples 
are The ONE Campaign in the United States and Make Poverty History Campaign in the United Kingdom 
(GCAP website: www.whiteband.org). 
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What made this Campaign distinctive from those of 1980s and 1990s as described in the 
previous chapter were the missions. There were two missions for Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa 
Campaign – the first mission states traditional advocacy approach in Japan, “to support civil 
society organizations’ policy recommendation activities for poverty alleviation.”  The second 
mission took another approach in encouraging participation of the general public in Japan – “to 
encourage individuals in Japan to learn the reality of poverty around the world as well as the 
structure that creates such poverty, to raise “voice” to “do something about world poverty”, to 
build public opinion, and to develop and create a social culture for making actions (Ibid, p.4)”.  
The highlight of the second mission was the white-band campaign, where the Japanese 
public were encouraged to wear white-bands to show solidarity. As numbers of celebrities 
including actors/actresses, musicians, and athletes began to wear white-bands and joined the 
Campaign’s “clicking film (a short commercial message where they snap their fingers every 
three seconds to show that children around the world are dying at this same rate)”, Hottokenai 
Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign caught extensive media attention. From July, 2005 to June, 2006, 
4,648,754 white-bands were sold all across the country. In part recognized as a fashion, the 
white-band approach successfully mobilized the public, including those who had never shown 
interest in international development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3  A Snapshot from the Japanese “Clicking Film” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign website (accessed February 12, 2008).  
In addition to white-bands, huge advertisements were seen in Yomiuri Shinbun and Asahi 
Shinbun, two of the major newspapers in Japan13 (Figure 3.4). Tokyo became one of the sites for 
the LIVE 8 charity concert on July 2nd, just before the G8 Summit in Gleneagles, along with 
London, Philadelphia, Paris, Rome, Berlin, Toronto, Johannesburg, Edinburg, and Moscow.  A 
major film festival was held in Tokyo, and also an event at Shiba Park with 3,500 participants 
where as a finale, a huge white-band appeared on Tokyo Tower (Figure 3.5). 
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13Circulation statistics for Yomiuri Shinbun are approximately 10 million papers a day, and 8 million for 
Asahi Shinbun.  
  
 
Figure 3.4   Newspaper Advertisements  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary translation: 
Attention Politicians! 
Do you know Millennium Development Goals? 
We can’t ‘let it go’ the upcoming general election; 
but we can’t also ‘let go’ the UN World Summit to be 
held three days after the election. 
 
Appeared in newspapers on July 27 and 28, 2005. 
Summary translation:  
A child dies every three seconds from lack of food 
and dirty water. To change such situation, we 
need your voice, not money. Please wear the 
white- band to show your voice to end poverty.  
 
Appeared in newspapers on September 6 and 7,  
2005. 
Source: Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign website (accessed February 12, 2008). 
 
 
 
38 
 
Figure 3.5   Event at Tokyo Tower 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign website (accessed February 12, 2008). 
The policy recommendation efforts as well as the white-band movement led to several 
transformations on foreign aid policies of the Japanese government. For example, the Prime 
Minister of Japan announced at the G8 Summit in 2005 to increase the official development 
assistance by 10 billion dollars; the government also announced an increase of the Global Fund 
to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Furthermore, they promised to double the amount of 
ODA to Africa in three years.  
 
3.2.2  Misunderstandings and Criticisms 
 
Despite the success in mobilizing the public, inquiries on the use of white-band sales flowed into 
the Campaign office. The Social Responsibility Report of Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa 
Campaign (2008) states that a typical question can be summarized as follows: 
39 
 
40 
 
“I bought the white-band as a donation because I thought poverty alleviation was 
important. But I heard the money raised is not be used for education or food in countries 
in Africa, but for information provision and policy recommendation on poverty. Is that 
true? (p.6)” 
This question directly relates to the core aim of the Campaign. The primary point of the 
Campaign, as stated in its mission, was not fundraising for direct service delivery in developing 
countries but to gather voices of the Japanese citizens.  
 Misunderstanding of the campaign aim led to severe criticisms across the media and on 
the internet. A cover story in Newsweek Japan titled Did White-Band Save Africa? (March 29, 
2006) showed a typical example of such criticism. The article refereed to a woman who bought 
the white-band for 300 yen (approximately US$2.75) who was shocked to learn that the money 
raised does not go to Africa. She said, “I felt cheated, and became suspicious of those celebrities 
(in the Campaign ads).”  
Criticisms were also seen in newspapers. For example, a housewife posted the following 
message in Asahi Shinbun on October 7, 2005:  
“I learned about the white-bands on BBC this spring. I sympathized with the people 
around the world who felt distressed about people living in extreme poverty, and bought 
the white-bands. According to the official Campaign website, profits of white-bands are 
used for production, distribution and activity fees. Advertisement fees also come from 
the activity fee that account for 40 percent of total profits. I learned that not all the 
money goes to poor people. It’s easy to participate with 300 yen. It may be the easy way 
to inform the public of this social movement. But I think it’s important for us to nurture 
a critical perspective rather than just riding the wave of trend.” 
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Following the mission, the Campaign had initially planned to use the profits made from 
sales of white-bands for running the Campaign per se - the aim of the Campaign was explicitly 
stated as advocacy, influencing policies of the Japanese government. However, the public 
unfamiliar with the word “advocacy” had misunderstood the aim of the Campaign as fundraising 
for service delivery, and insisted that the Campaign should use the profits for development 
projects in the Southern recipient countries. 
This inclination for fundraising for service delivery among the audience was also pointed 
out by Kuroda and Imata (2004), the two important figures in running Hottokenai Sekai no 
Mazushisa Campaign: 
Generally speaking, the Japanese donors still expect the Japanese NGOs to deliver 
services (in education, health, environment, etc.) in communities in developing countries. 
They do not want their money to be used to lobby Japanese government for policy 
change, or for public awareness raising campaign in global issues (p.3).  
In response to severe criticisms, the Campaign decided to donate 250 thousand US 
dollars to The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and 50 thousand dollars to 
related civil society activities. The Campaign further decided that the profits made through sales 
of individual NGOs are to be used by relevant NGOs for their projects. Although initially 
planned as an advocacy campaign, Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign had to incorporate 
the aspect of fundraising for service delivery into their initiative.    
The success of bringing together numbers of NGOs into one campaign, gaining media 
attention, and encouraging the Japanese public to participate in the Campaign was, without doubt, 
an achievement of development NGOs’ efforts to elevate their advocacy work. However, their 
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intention was hampered by the Japanese public, who expected development NGOs to be 
fundraisers, not educators nor advocates.  
 
3.3  THE NEW CHALLENGE OF NGO ADVOCACY 
 
With an eased legal environment since the early 2000s, development NGOs have increasingly 
become capable of promoting active advocacy in Japan. Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa 
Campaign of 2005 was a reflection of enhanced advocacy efforts, which came to be a turning 
point in terms of approach and audience of NGO advocacy in Japan. In this campaign, NGOs 
elaborated their approach from mere lobbying to intentional mobilization of the general public. 
Encouraging the public to wear white-bands was one of the symbolic attempts in this regard, a 
new experiment for NGO advocacy in Japan.   
 NGOs faced a new challenge, however, as they began to deal with the general public. The 
public unfamiliar with the word adobokashi (a Japanese word for advocacy) misunderstood the 
aim of the advocacy campaign as fundraising for service delivery, insisting that the campaign 
should use the profits for development projects in the Southern recipient countries. This showed 
how the public recognizes development NGOs as fundraisers, neither as advocates nor educators; 
this public recognition stands as the new barrier for NGOs to promote advocacy in Japan. 
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4.0 CONCLUSION: THE NEXT STAGE FOR NGO ADVOCACY IN JAPAN 
 
4.1 NEW APPROACH, NEW AUDIENCE, NEW CHALLENGE 
 
In analyzing the obstacles development NGOs in Japan face in undertaking advocacy work, the 
paper showed expansion of approach and audience from 1980s and 1990s to 2000s onwards. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, development NGOs in Japan faced an unfavorable legal structure 
that led these organizations to suffer from chronic financial instability. Forced to emphasize 
fundraising for service delivery, many of the development NGOs in Japan did not have sufficient 
capacity to undertake other types of public communication programs including advocacy. The 
restricted environment only allowed limited number of NGOs to engage in advocacy work 
during this period. These efforts turned out to be mostly policy recommendation to the decision-
makers, i.e. politicians and bureaucrats in the Japanese government, through lobbying.  
 Unfavorable legal structure began to show dramatic change as we approached the 
millennium. The new NPO Law was enacted in 1998 and the new tax system for nonprofits was 
instituted in 2001. These two frameworks gradually eased the issue of financial instability among 
development NGOs, thus allowing them to incorporate more advocacy work into their operations. 
Enhanced engagement in advocacy led to successful implementation of Hottokenai Sekai no 
Mazushisa Campaign in 2005, which came to mark a major turning point of NGO advocacy in  
Japan. Although the aim of advocacy efforts remained as changing policies primarily of the 
Japanese governments, we saw a huge gear shift in approach and audience - not only were NGOs 
engaged in lobbying the decision-makers, but they intentionally employed a campaign approach 
to mobilize the public, through “white-bands” and various events. This expansion of approach 
and audience brought about new challenge to NGO advocacy in Japan – NGOs now face the 
Japanese public who has the tendency to regard development NGOs as fundraisers rather than 
advocates. The public thus have hard time understanding what advocacy aims for, as reflected in 
the criticisms of Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign that mostly insisted on sending 
money to Africa for direct service delivery.  
 
Figure 4.1  Expansion of Approach and Audience in NGO Advocacy in Japan 
 Lobbying to         
Decision-Makers  
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raising aspect.  
                                                           
To summarize, as advocacy approach and audience expanded from 1980s and 1990s to 
2000s onwards (Figure 4.1), the challenge for NGO advocacy accordingly shifted from 
incapacity resulting from unfavorable legal structure to unreceptive audience. The new stage for 
NGO advocacy in Japan thus calls for careful attention to the qualitative aspect of advocacy 
work, i.e. messages articulated and delivered to the audience. As Lindenberg and Bryant (2002) 
states, “a process of education is required to explain what advocacy entails and to break through 
old stereotypes (p.181).” Development NGOs in Japan needs to become increasingly conscious 
about wording and images used in their advocacy work so as to educate the Japanese public of 
their roles as advocates, not necessarily fundraisers for providing services in the developing 
world. 
NGO advocacy in Japan today seems to be making a good start in this regard. On March 
22, 2008, G8 Summit NGO Forum announced a launch of new campaign called “One Million 
Tanzaku 14  Project.” In this campaign, the Japanese public is encouraged to make short 
statements of what they envision the world to be in the future15. The approach taken in this 
project is clearly an intentional mobilization of public to enhance citizens’ voice towards the 
governments of Japan and other G8 countries, without involving a fund
Capacities for advocacy among individual NGOs have also been enhanced from 2005 to 
date, which could potentially lead to raising NGO awareness towards qualitative aspect of 
advocacy work. One example is World Vision Japan, who introduced a post exclusively for 
doing advocacy in 2007 and a new budget category of “advocacy” in 2008 (World Vision Japan, 
 
14Tanzaku is a small piece of paper that people in Japan write wishes to hang on bamboo for traditional 
star festival called Tanabata on July 7th.  
15G8 Summit NGO Forum News. http://www.g8ngoforum.org/2008/03/1004.html (accessed April 6, 
2008).  
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2008)16. Furthermore, some NGOs and advocacy campaigns have already begun to engage in 
fundraising exclusively for advocacy. Besides the two primary advocacy campaigning body, 
Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign and G8 NPO Forum, Kansai NPO Council is a 
remarkable example. Though limited in time from April, 2007 to March, 2008, the Council 
called for “Contributions to Support Policy Recommendation for ODA Policies” (the Council 
uses adobokashi (a Japanese word for advocacy) and policy recommendation interchangeably) 
with the aim of 500,000 yen (about US$4500). While it remains unknown whether Kansai NPO 
Council was able to achieve this target amount, the attempt itself is worth noting. There are also 
enhanced grant opportunity for NGO advocacy.  “Advocacy Start-Up Initiative” established by 
Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign is a prominent example. This is a grant opportunity to 
encourage individual development NGOs’ advocacy work. Because the Japanese government do 
not offer any grant programs to support NGO, this initiative merits attention.   
 
4.2  ACADEMIC AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
Being one of the few studies that closely examines NGO advocacy in Japan, this paper has two 
core implications. First, the analysis shows the importance of understanding NGO advocacy in 
local context in which its work is embedded.  In Japan, advocacy was virtually considered as a 
work aiming to change policies rather than practices. It was also considered to be closely linked 
to lobbying until very recently, a tradition reflected in the fact that several NGOs’ refer to 
“advocacy (adobokashi)” followed by “policy recommendation (seisaku teigen)” in parenthesis 
 
16Only Japan Results, Oxfam Japan, and Action Against Child Exploitation have “advocacy” as 
independent budget category among the 67 organizations listed in Appendix. 
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(see Appendix). It is also interesting to see how advocacy efforts are often not linked to 
development education; the two functions are considered as distinctive. The study thus shows a 
unique interpretation of NGO advocacy in Japan.  
 The second implication of this study is a practical recommendation. As the barrier for 
NGO advocacy shift to unreceptive Japanese public, NGOs in Japan must become increasingly 
conscious about the message to be articulated in advocacy. In creating advocacy message, NGOs 
must presume lack of understanding among the audience as to what advocacy aims for, and seek 
for a message that makes a clear distinction from fundraising for service delivery.  
 
4.3  IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The findings of this paper imply three agendas for future research. The first agenda involves in-
depth analysis of the Japanese public’s perception towards development NGOs. Why does the 
Japanese public tend to regard development NGOs as fundraisers, neither as advocates nor 
educators?   How did the Japanese public come to have such recognition? For limited amount of 
resources available being outside Japan, I was only able to indicate the trend through the 
criticisms of Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign in this paper. Further analysis of NGO 
history in Japan combined with media analysis, i.e. newspapers, merits attention. Content 
analysis of textbooks used in Japanese school education, with regard to how “NGOs” or 
“international development” is taught may also prove worthwhile.    
 The second research agenda is to explore why development NGOs in Japan seek to 
promote advocacy despite the unreceptive public. What are the driving forces for these NGOs to  
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pursue the role of advocates?  In-depth analysis of motivations among individual NGO in 
engaging in advocacy work, e.g. through interviews to NGO staff members, would be an interest 
research agenda in thinking about the incentives of NGO advocacy in Japan. One potential factor 
is the outside influence, i.e. international advocacy campaigns and international NGOs. Many of 
the advocacy cases examined in this paper certainly implied a significant role played by the 
international advocacy campaigns in stimulating Japanese NGOs to launch their initiatives. For 
example, lobbying efforts to cancel the ODA loan project in India was stimulated by the global 
anti-Narmada campaign; the anti-landmine campaign was clearly influenced by the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL); and Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign was 
stimulated by the Global Call to Act Against Poverty (G-CAP). Notice, however, that these 
outside influences were mostly international advocacy campaigns, not necessarily international 
NGOs. While it is true that some of the advocacy efforts were led by international NGOs - 
Friends of the Earth Japan again in the case of Narmada ODA loan project, and Oxfam Japan in 
the case of Hottokenai Sekai no Mazushisa Campaign – domestic NGOs were also as active in 
taking initiatives (e.g. Japan International Volunteer Center in the case of Pesticide ODA project). 
This trend also seems to be reflected in Appendix, where only 13 organizations out of 67 
organizations involved in advocacy in Japan are international NGOs. In exploring the incentives 
for advocacy among NGOs in Japan, we must consciously distinguish domestic and international 
NGOs; moreover, we must carefully take into account the distance between international NGOs  
in Japan and their international partnerships/coalitions.  
 The third future research agenda is a more practice-oriented study taking a closer look at 
the message framing process of advocacy campaigns in Japan. How would NGOs frame its  
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advocacy message so as to attract and transform unreceptive audience? Would NGOs need to 
take further different approaches in advocacy efforts, or make stronger link between advocacy 
and other programs, e.g. educational efforts? Examining these questions would contribute to 
enhance NGOs’ advocacy efforts in Japan, given the importance of qualitative aspect of NGO 
advocacy as discussed in this paper.  
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Appendix: List of Development NGOs Involved in Advocacy in Japan
Name
International/
Domestic
Overall Budget Scale  
(million yen)
Reference to Advocacy Work in Websit
(if any, in the words used by individual 
e/Pamphlets
organizations)
                                                
Legal Status Tax‐Deductable Status
1 Japan Volunteer Center Domestic Over 100 Research, Policy Recommendation Specified Nonprofit Corporation Approved Specified Nonprofit Organization
2 WE21 Japan Domestic 50 ‐ 100  N/A Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
3 Earth Tree Domestic 10‐20 m Global Education Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
4 CARE International Japan International Over 100 N/A Foundation (PIP) N/A
5 Campaign for Children of Palestine Domestic 50 ‐ 100  N/A Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
6 Shaplaneer Domestic Over 100 Awareness Raising, Educational Programs, Study Tours, Development Education Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A (in process)
7 SHARE Domestic 50 ‐ 100  Awareness Raising Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
8 JOICFP Domestic Over 100 Advocacy Foundation (PIP) Specified Public Interest Enhancement Corporation (PIP)
9 Save Chernobyl Chubu  Domestic 20‐50  N/A Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
10 NPO 2050 Domestic 50 ‐ 100  N/A Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
11 Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation Domestic 50 ‐ 100  Research, Policy Recommendation, Awareness Raising, Educational Programs Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
12 Development Education Association and Resource Center Domestic 20‐50  Development education Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
13 Action Against Child Exploitation Domestic 5‐10 m Policy Recommendation, Awareness Raising, Educational Programs, Networking Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
14 Africa Japan Forum Domestic 20‐50  Research, Policy Recoomendation, Networking, Promoting Understanding Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
15 Japan Team of Young Human Power Domestic Over 100 Awareness Raising Specified Nonprofit Corporation Approved Specified Nonprofit Organization
16 Asian Women and Children's Network Domestic 20‐50  Movement for Commercial Sexual Exploitation and Violence N/A N/A
17 Kansai NPO Alliance Domestic 50 ‐ 100  Research, Policy Recommendation Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
18 Free the Children Japan International 10‐20 m Advocacy (Information Provision to Raise Awareness) Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
19 People's Forum on Cambodia, Japan Domestic Under 5  Policy Recommendation N/A N/A
20 Larigrans Japan Domestic 10‐20 m Awareness Raising N/A N/A
21 A SEED JAPAN Domestic 50 ‐ 100  Policy Recommendation, Awareness Raising N/A N/A
22 Global Village International 10‐20 m Reflecting on social/economic structure N/A N/A
23 Asia Health Institute Domestic Over 100 Educational Programs Foundation (PIP) N/A
24 Japan NGO Network on Indonesia Domestic Under 5  Dialogue with Government/International Organizations, Policy Recommendation N/A N/A
25 Jumma Net Domestic 5‐10 m Policy Recommendation N/A N/A
26 Fukuoka NGO Network Domestic 5‐10 m Educational Programs Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
27 People to People Aid Domestic 10‐20 m Advocacy (Policy Recommendation) Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
28 Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines Domestic 20‐50  Advocacy (Policy Recommendation) N/A N/A
29 Third World Shop Domestic 5‐10 m N/A Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
30 Musashino Network for Pinatubo Rehabilitation Domestic Under 5  Education for International Understanding N/A N/A
31 HANDS Domestic Over 100 Advocacy (Policy Recommendation Based on Research), Organizing Symposium, Information Provision Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
Kansai Council    Domestic ‐   Spec e Nonpro Corporatio   
33 Interband Domestic Under 5  N/A Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
34 FoE Japan International Over 100 Information provision, Awareness Raising Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
35 21 Century Association Domestic 5‐10 m Advocacy Specified Nonprofit Corporation Approved Specified Nonprofit Organization
36 Supa Domestic 20‐50  Organizing symposium, Educational Programs Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
37 Action with Lao Children Domestic 50 ‐ 100  N/A Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
38 Japan International Center for the Rights of the Child Domestic 5‐10 m Promoting Declaration of Rights of the Child Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
39 Hunger Free World Domestic Over 100 Organizing Events/Symposiums, Study Tours, Educational Programs, Information Provision Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
40 Indonesia Education Promoting Foundation Domestic 5‐10 m N/A N/A N/A
41 PEACEBOAT International 5‐10 m N/A N/A N/A
42 Peace Winds Japan Domestic Over 100 Information Provision, Education for International Understandin Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
43 Nagoya NPO Center Domestic 10‐20 m N/A Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
44 JACSES Domestic 20‐50  Research, Policy Recommendation, Information Provision Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
45 VERDA LERNEJO Domestic Over 100 N/A N/A N/A
46 International Society for MangroveEcosystems Domestic 50 ‐ 100  Information provision, Citizenship Education, Research Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
47 Saitama NGO Council for International Cooperation Domestic Under 5  N/A N/A N/A
48 Asia Pacific Resource Center Domestic 50 ‐ 100  N/A Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
49 ODA‐NET Domestic Under 5  Policy Recommendation, Campaigning N/A N/A
50 Oxfam Japan International 20‐50  Policy Recommendation Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
51 Japan‐Nepal Educational Cooperative Society　   Domestic 5‐10 m Educational Programs, Study Tours N/A N/A
52 Kyoto NGO Association Domestic Under 5  Educational Programs, Research N/A N/A
53 Japan Asian Association and Asian Friendship Society Domestic Over 100 Educational Programs Aggregate Corporation (PIP) N/A
54 AMDA International Over 100 N/A Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
55 JEN Domestic Over 100 N/A Specified Nonprofit Corporation Approved Specified Nonprofit Organization
56 Sapporo Jiyu Gakko "Yu" Domestic 10‐20 m Research, Policy Recommendation Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
57 Shanti Volunteer Association Domestic Over 100 Research, Policy Recommendation Aggregate Corporation (PIP) Specified Public Interest Enhancement Corporation (PIP)
58 Network Earth Village ‐ Environment and Peace NGO International Over 100 N/A Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
59 People's Hope Japan International Over 100 N/A Specified Nonprofit Corporation Approved Specified Nonprofit Organization
60 Medicins Sans Frontier Japan International 50 ‐ 100  N/A Specified Nonprofit Corporation Approved Specified Nonprofit Organization
61 World Vision Japan International Over 100 Advocacy Specified Nonprofit Corporation Approved Specified Nonprofit Organization
62 Educational Support Center Domestic Under 5  Research N/A N/A
63 Japan Results International Under 5  Advocacy (Policy Recommendation) N/A N/A
64 Japan Action Network on Small Arms International Under 5  Awareness Raising, Campaigning for Arms Trade Treaty N/A N/A
65 Caring for Young Refugees Domestic 50 ‐ 100  N/A Specified Nonprofit Corporation Approved Specified Nonprofit Organization
66 Ehime Global Network Domestic 5‐10 m N/A Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
67 Somneed Domestic 50 ‐ 100  N/A Specified Nonprofit Corporation N/A
Source: JANIC Online Database (accessed February 3, 2008) and pamphlets and websites of individual NGOs (accessed from February 4 to March 3, 2008)
Note i i involved in internationa ltural h ice de for foreigners in Japan luded from th Database caton of in vidual s; th all s involved in internat                                                   ‐                        
Note 2) 1 million yen = approximately US$9090 (caluculated at the rate $1 = 110 yen
Note 3) PIP = Public‐Interest Legal Persons (see 2.2)
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